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A Sovereign Debt Restructuring Reverie· 
Steven L. Schwarcz ** 
In a prior article, the author asked why, if a sovereign debt restructuring 
treaty would be effective and easy to implement, one does not yet exist. 
There appeared to be at least three reasons: the very novelty of the 
approach; the opposition of interest groups who believe that a treaty 
approach would make it too easy for sovereign debtors to default; and the 
failure of parties to appreciate the importance of a treaty approach, coupled 
with concern over ceding sovereignty.! In this short reverie, the author 
hopes to show that these reasons are flawed and that, even where bond 
issues already include collective action clauses, a treaty approach would 
benefit both debtor-nations and their creditors. 
The room hushed as Premier Gursky walked in. Gursky glared at his 
ministers, finally focusing on Y osef Steif. As Minister of Finance, Steif knew 
what was coming. 
"Trans-Ptomaineia is rapidly exhausting its foreign reserves, and I fear we 
will have no choice soon but to default on our bonds," said the Premier. "I want 
you, Minister Steif, to examine our options and to report back within two days. 
If we default, or if we restructure our debts unilaterally, our nation will suffer 
grave reputational costs in the world fmandal community."z Steif immediately 
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set his staff to explore the sovereign debt restructuring options. The computers 
were temporarily down-"damn, a decade after Y2K and still there are bugs in 
the system"-so staff members actually had to start their research in one of their 
country's few remaining libraries. Twenty-four hours later, the staff reported 
back with two possible approaches: one depending solely on privately negotiated 
agreements between their nation and its creditors (a "contractual approach"), the 
other based on a public international law convention, or treaty, among nations (a 
"treaty approach"). 
Under the contractual approach, for each bond issue requiring individual 
bondholder approval to change essential payment terms (such as the amount of 
principal, the rate of interest, or the maturity schedule), Trans-Ptomaineia would 
offer bondholders the option of exchanging their existing bonds for new bonds 
having less stringent payment terms-terms that Trans-Ptomaineia could 
manage to pay. To induce as many bondholders as possible to agree to this 
exchange, exchanging bondholders would be asked to waive various protections 
in their bond indentures that can be waived without unanimity, such as cross 
default and negative pledge covenants. Bondholders not agreeing to exchange 
then would ftnd these contractual protections gone if a sufftcient majority of 
other bondholders consent.3 Years ago, Ecuador was reported as having used 
this strategy,4 although its bonds may have lost about 40 percent of their net 
present value as a result.s 
On the other hand, approximately half of Trans-Ptomaineia's existing bond 
issues did not require individual bondholder approval to change essential 
payment terms. These bond issues included "collective action clauses,,,6 allowing 
even payment terms to be changed through "supermajority voting.,,7 For these 
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issues, it would be easier to agree on debt restructuring terms with creditors 
because, if and when the relevant supermajority of bondholders agreed to terms, 
their agreement would bind any objecting bondholders. 
The treaty approach to sovereign debt restructuring, Steif learned, would 
rely on a newly-opened treaty among States, based on a model developed in 
20008 and later proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).9 A debtor 
State taking advantage of this treaty would agree to conduct its economic 
policies so as to put itself back on the road to viable growth, in exchange for 
which the treaty would give priority to repayment of new private moneys loaned 
to the debtor State. The treaty also would empower the debtor State and a 
supermajority of its creditors to approve a restructuring plan, which would bind 
all creditors, notwithstanding the objections of holdouts against whom the plan 
did not discriminate. to 
Steif pondered: Which approach, the public law treaty or the private law 
contract negotiation, would be more effective and pragmatic for his nation? And 
should he recommend using a combination of these approaches? To answer 
that, Steif flrst had to understand better the problems associated with sovereign 
debt restructuring. His staff reported that there are three: the holdout or 
collective action problem; the moral hazard problem; and the taxpayer-funding 
problem. 
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The collective action problem, Steif learned, arises because the conflicting 
interests of a debtor State and its creditors make it difficult to reach complete 
agreement on a restructuring plan, a difficulty exacerbated, and sometimes made 
impossible, by the task of attempting to reach agreement among the State's many 
creditors. I I Except for the bond issues (about half, Steif recalled) governed by 
collective action clauses, the staff found, not unexpectedly, that most of the 
remaining bond indentures require individual bondholder consent in order to 
alter essential payment terms. Therefore, one or more bondholders may hold 
out, hoping that the overall desire to reach an agreement will induce Trans-
Ptomaineia, or even other creditors, to buyout their claims or pay them a 
premium. In practice, though, holdouts discourage all creditors, even those who 
otherwise wish to reach an agreement, from agreeing to a debt restructuring 
plan. 
Worse, the staff reported, the collective action problem in Trans-
Ptomaineia's case is even more intractable because its bonds, like those of many 
other nations, are held by hundreds, if not thousands, of investors, located in 
dozens of countries.12 Furthermore, in many cases the bonds are held in 
nominee name, so it is difficult and costly to ascertain the actual identity of the 
bondholder.13 And, because the bonds are actively traded, the identity of 
bondholders constantly changes.14 
Steif also learned that sovereign debt restructuring potentially creates a 
second problem: moral hazard, or the greater tendency of people who are 
protected from the consequences of risky behavior to engage in that behavior. 
Moral hazard typically results where multilateral governmental entities such as 
the IMF act as lender of last resort to financially troubled States, enabling them 
to avoid default and its consequences. From the standpoint of a debtor State, the 
moral hazard problem means that countries anticipating an IMF bailout might 
have less reason to take a prudent economic course. IS From the standpoint of 
creditors, the moral hazard problem is that lenders that anticipate being 
protected from default might have a greater tendency to take unwarranted 
financial risk. 
Steif laughed! If the IMF is prepared to bail his country out without 
needing to take a prudent economic course, fine with him and his countrymen. 
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But fat chance: as early as 1999 the IMP refused to act as a lender of last resort 
when Ecuador defaulted on Eurobond payments, and it again refused in 2001 to 
bail out Argentina.16 Recent events have only confirmed that refusal.17 
The third problem of sovereign debt restructuring, however, resonated 
more clearly with Steif: where to obtain the funding so critical to ensuring that 
essential governmental functions do not collapse during the restructuring 
period? In the distant past, much of this money was provided by the IMP in the 
form of loans. These loans, though, became politically controversial when the 
taxpayers of IMP member States realized that they themselves were funding 
them,18 thereby indirectly subsidizing not only defaulting States but also the 
defaulting States' creditors. Where could Trans-Ptomaineia obtain this funding? 
Having identified the problems-effectively the collective action problem 
of binding holdout creditors to a reasonable debt restructuring plan, and the 
problem of finding funding to maintain his nation's essential governmental 
functions-Steif turned to finding possible solutions. Although it was already 
nightfall, he was scheduled to present his findings to the Premier and other 
Ministers the next day, and he would not fail. The way to vet this out, he 
decided, was to bring his staff together, notwithstanding the late hour, to 
intelligently debate the solutions. 
By 9 PM, his staff had assembled-some grumbling-in Steifs large office. 
"Which approach," he asked, "private law contract negotiation or the new public 
law treaty, would be more effective and pragmatic for Trans-Ptomaineia?" 
Tulani, the senior staffer, stood up and spoke on behalf of the others. 
"Both approaches address the collective action problem," she said, "but the 
treaty would solve it much more effectively. Under the treaty, supermajority 
voting, requiring an affirmative vote in favor of a restructuring plan by Trans-
Ptomaineia's creditors holding merely two-thirds in amount of the outstanding 
debt, would bind all of Trans-Ptomaineia's objecting creditors, even those who 
vote negatively or fail to vote.,,19 'Without supermajority voting imposed by 
treaty," Tulani continued, "any attempt by our nation to change the essential 
terms of its bargain with creditors would often require unanimous approval. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
But the IMP did agree to reschedule existing Argentine loans. Schwarcz, 53 Emory L J at 1194-95 
n 25 (cited in note 1). 
For a detailed discussion of IMF practices in various sovereign debt crises, at least through 2002, 
see Hal S. Scott, A Bankmptry Procedurefor Sovereign Debtors?, 37 Ind Law 103, 108-12 (2003). 
To understand why, see Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 963-66 (cited in note 7). 
See Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 1003-06 (cited in note 7) and Schwarcz, 53 Emory L J at 
1192-94 (cited in note 1) (discussing supermajority voting). See also Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev 
at 1012-13 (cited in note 7) (proposing that any sovereign debt restructuring treaty be retroactive, 
binding all existing creditors, and explaining why such retroactivity would be respected under 
international law). 
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And, although we theoretically could attempt to settle with creditors individually 
notwithstanding their contractual protection of unanimity, the Allied Bank casezo 
holds that this settlement would not bind other creditors, who could then sue 
Trans-Ptomaineia on the original claims." 
"Fascinating," Steif said. "But in all fairness, why should nations and 
international organizations respect a treaty that potentially can discriminate 
against those objecting creditors?" 
Tulani replied, "Discrimination is impossible because, under the treaty, the 
supermajority voting is done by classes of claims that are substantially similar to 
the other claims of their class.z1 Therefore, a vote by holders of the requisite 
supermajority that benefits their claims will also benefit holders of substantially 
similar claims. And, if a sufficient minority of creditors of any class does not like 
the restructuring plan, they can veto it."zZ 
"In contrast," Tulani continued, "private law contract negotiation cannot 
completely solve our collective action problem. Half of our nation's bond issues 
lack collective action clauses. For those bonds, we would have to try using 
exchange offers in order to coerce agreement to the terms of a restructuring 
plan. Experience shows, however, that their utility is limited. Ecuador, for 
example, tried using an exchange offering under which the new bonds had both 
a buyback provision and a principal reinstatement provision that were 
considered favorable to accepting creditors. At the same time, creditors 
accepting the exchange would be bound by exit consentsZ3 that significantly 
altered the nonfinancial terms of remaining outstanding bonds to the detriment 
of holdout creditors. Even with this aggressive approach, 3 percent of Ecuador's 
creditors continued to hold out and later sued Ecuador directly on their 
uncompromised claims,z4 thereby jeopardizing the success of any future 
exchange offering that fails to obtain 100 percent participation."z5 
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"Furthermore," Tulani noted, "bond exchange offers are extremely costly. 
For example, Ecuador's bonds lost about 40 percent of their net present value 
due, at least in part, to that nation's exchange offer?6 That does not even take 
into account the transaction costs of effectuating the exchange offer! And 
coercive exchange offers themselves may create legal problems.,,27 
"You've got me thinking," responded Steif. "There's an important 
additional reason why the treaty is much better than using exchange offers. Even 
if we otherwise could persuade the requisite supermajority of bondholders in each 
bond issue with collective action clauses, and 100 percent of bondholders in 
every other bond issue, to agree to the terms of a restructuring plan, we'd still 
face a potential collective action problem. Collective action clauses only operate 
within a given bond issue, not across multiple bond issues. Therefore, investors 
in one or more of our bond issues could hold out in order to get better terms! In 
fact, now that I think of it, we also have some non bonded indebtedness in the 
form of bank loans, and it's not inconceivable that individual banks also could 
hold out. Under the treaty, though, that type of holdout behavior is impossible. 
Creditors having the same priority of claims would vote as a single class, even if 
they lack contractual affiliation with other creditors in the class.28 Because the 
claims of all of our bondholders and bank creditors are, in fact, pari passu,29 we 
could classify all of them together and bind them, voting as single group, by one 
supermajority vote. This is a powerful solution because it gives individual 
holdouts much less ability to stymie the will of the vast majority of our nation's 
creditors.,,3o 
"Excellent point!" exclaimed Tulani. "From the standpoint of solving the 
collective action problem, there's no question the treaty approach is much more 
effective than the contractual approach. But there's an additiona4 and equallY 
important, reason w~ Trans-Ptomaineia should go with the treaty approach: the contractual 
approach simply doesn't address our need for funding to run essential 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
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action clauses],,). 
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governmental services during the restructuring period.31 We no longer can rely 
on the IMF to provide this funding, so we'll have to borrow from commercial 
sources, such as banks or capital-market investors. But without giving new 
investors a priority over our existing indebtedness, there's no damn way they'll 
lend to us. New investors simply won't want to be taxed by the claims of 
existing creditors!32 The treaty, however, concretely solves this problem by 
granting first priority to the claims of investors that provide the restructuring 
financing.,,33 
Steif frowned. ''Why can't we simply issue new bonds that have priority, 
under Trans-Ptomaineian law, to all existing creditor claims?" 
"The reason," Tulani replied, "is two-fold. First, new investors would 
worry that we simply could change Trans-Ptomaineian law in the future to take 
away their priority.34 The second reason is that giving priority to new investors 
under our nation's internal law might offend our existing creditors, and thereby 
impair our access to future commercial credit.,,35 
"Similarly," continued Tulani, "it would be impractical to give the new 
bonds priority by trying to negotiate with our existing creditors to subordinate 
their claims. Even though, in theory, they should agree to the subordination in 
order to accommodate the restructuring financing,36 the reality is that we'd again 
face an insurmountable collective action problem in trying to get all creditors on 
board.,,37 
"It's clear, then," exclaimed Steif. "1 will recommend to Premier Gursky 
tomorrow that we go with the treaty approach. He may ask me, though, about 
the mechanics of implementing that approach. For example, are we a party yet 
to the treaty? What do we need to do to become a party to the treaty? And what 
costs would we incur by choosing this approach?" 
''Well, we're not yet a party to the treaty," responded Tulani, "but it's fairly 
easy to become a party. All we need to do is to have the Parliament enact 
legislation making the treaty effective under our internal law. 38 Then, under our 
31 
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Constitution, the Premier and Minister of State can sign, and thereby ratify, the 
treaty. The treaty binds creditors from ratifying countries because, as mentioned, 
each country must also enact the legislation needed to make the treaty's 
provisions part of that country's internal law.39 Although that alone would be 
insufficient to bind creditors from nonratifying countries-and, because only a 
dozen countries have so far signed the treaty, it's almost certain that some of our 
bondholders are from nonratifying countries-we still should be okay because 
the Minister of Law believes the treaty should also bind creditors whose debt 
instruments are governed by the law of a ratifying country.40 All of Trans-
Ptomaineia's debt is evidenced by bond indentures or loan agreements governed 
by either New York or United Kingdom law41 and, happily, both the United 
States and the UK have already ratified the treaty." 
"But I thought the US Government has been opposing the treaty!" 
exclaimed Steif. 
"For years they had," Tulani explained.42 "Until they realized that simple 
contracting can't be the full answer. Then they bowed to international pressure 
to sign." "The costs of using the treaty also should be minimal," Tulani 
continued. "The treaty is largely self-administering. We would simply negotiate 
with our creditors to determine mutually acceptable terms on which to 
restructure our debt. The treaty itself provides powerful aids to induce this 
negotiation.43 We can't, for example, cram an unreasonable restructuring plan 
down the throats of our creditors; if we tried that, creditors damn well wouldn't 
approve it.44 On the other hand, creditors won't want to veto a reasonable plan 
because, until a plan's approved, they won't begin to be paid under it." 
"Out-of-pocket costs likewise should be minimal. The IMF would perform 
the treaty's few administrative tasks.45 Disputes should rarely arise because the 
treaty's rules are narrowly crafted to minimize adjudicatory discretion.46 Any 
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either the good faith requirement for filing or the right of creditors to object to an excessive 
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disputes that do arise probably would be limited to disagreement with existing 
creditors over the amount of restructuring fmancing that we request.47 I don't 
anticipate we'd have that disagreement, but if we do it would be quickly resolved 
through arbitration supervised by the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, or ICSID.48 This is an arm of the World Bank that we've 
relied on many times before for arbitrating investment disputes between our 
nation and foreign nationals. The only cost is nominal: ICSID charges for use of 
its arbitration facilities.,,49 
Steif sighed with relief, both for himself and his nation: "What good 
fortune for the people of Trans-Ptomaineia, and indeed for all of Trans-
Ptomaineia's honest creditors, that this sovereign debt restructuring treaty now 
exists. A year earlier, and it would have been a very different story!" 
47 
48 
49 
amount of restructuring financing [but] disputes over whether bankruptcy filings are made in 
good faith are extremely unusual even in a corporate context, [and] corporate creditors 'very 
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